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ARTICLES
ALL (WATER) POLITICS IS LOCAL: A PROPOSAL FOR
RESOLVING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES
Jeffrey S. Dornbos *
"Thefrog... does not drink up the pond in which he lives."
Aztec Proverb'
On April 2, 1984, representatives of the United States and Canada
signed an agreement2 that ended a forty-two year dispute over the
construction of a dam. The agreement provided that the United
States would not raise the height of a hydroelectric dam in exchange
for a long term supply of power from Canada at the price that it
would have cost to build the dam.4 After the protracted forty-two year
dispute, both sides were pleased-the United States obtained
inexpensive power, and Canada saved its pristine wilderness from
flooding.5 The outcome was a success. Notably, the process had been
described as both "at odds with the usual evolution of international
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1. GARY HOLTHAUS, FROM THE FARM TO THE TABLE: WHAT ALL AMERICANS
NEED TO KNow ABOUT AGRICULTURE 199 (2006).
2. Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to the
Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend d'Oreille
River, U.S.-Can., Apr. 2, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,088 [hereinafter Skagit River
Treaty].
3. CANADA AMONG NATIONS: 1984: A TIME OF TRANSITION 190 (Brian W.
Tomlin & Maureen Molot eds., 1985).
4. Treaty Ends Seattle-B.C. Dam Dispute, SPOKANE CHRONICLE, June 28,
1984, at 3.
5. Id.
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agreements," 6 and "appropriate for the problem at hand."' The
process was at odds with typical agreements because in this instance,
negotiations did not occur between diplomats at the highest levels of
government, but rather between representatives of British Columbia
and Seattle, Washington.8 It was an "unusual situation" because it
involved negotiations between an American city and a Canadian
province. 9 Canadian Intergovernmental Relations Minister Garde
Gardom described the solution obtained by the unusual process as
"an environmental victory [which] [made] economic sense."10
President Reagan described the process as "constructively and
ingeniously settled."'"
The successful process provides a model for other transboundary
negotiations. This Article argues that transnational water agreements
should include a rebuttable presumption that negotiations over
transboundary water disputes begin with regional committees
organized at the lowest appropriate hydrological level. The argument
is analyzed in two parts. First, transboundary water agreements
should include the creation, or continuation, of water committees
organized around hydrologic boundaries-such as a lakes, rivers, or
aquifers-rather than political or jurisdictional boundaries. Second,
when transboundary water disputes arise, the cooperating States
should empower the most decentralized, or "lowest," committee
possible to reach a solution. For example, negotiations over a dispute
surrounding the discharge of pollution into a river shared by two
small border towns should begin with a regional body, comprised of
representatives from both towns, tasked with managing the river.
Alternatively, negotiations surrounding a dispute over the withdrawal
of massive amounts of Great Lakes water should begin with a
6. Donald K. Alper & Robert L. Monahan, Regional Transboundary
Negotiations Leading to the Skagit River Treaty: Analysis and Future Application,
12 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y 163, 163 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 163-64.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends
for Resolving Them, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 49, 84
(The Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct. of Arb. ed., 2003).
11. Seattle-B.C. Dam Dispute, supra note 4, at 3.
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"higher," more centralized, decision-making body, such as the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council.12
Part I of this Article presents three essential components for
managing transboundary water resources. First, cooperation among
all stakeholders is essential to managing commons resources and
avoiding the problems presented by the tragedy of commons.
Second, because there is often a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
hydrologically connected water resources (withdrawing groundwater,
for example, might have profound but little understood implications
for nearby surface water) completing long-term studies of the water
resource is imperative. Third, public participation is a key element in
successfully managing transboundary water resources. Part I argues
that successful management of transboundary resources, therefore,
requires fostering long-term cooperation, gathering accurate data, and
promoting public participation.
Part II of this Article presents the argument that transnational water
agreements should include a rebuttable presumption that negotiations
over transboundary water disputes begin with regional committees
organized at the lowest appropriate hydrological level. Part II begins
by comparing and contrasting two examples of approaching
transboundary water disputes-the Skagit River treaty and the All-
American Canal dispute-and argues that these case studies
demonstrate the usefulness of negotiating transboundary water
disputes at the lowest appropriate level. While the comparison has its
limits, it provides a helpful starting point for considering the
usefulness of decentralized decision-making. Part II goes on to
highlight the International Joint Commission's ("IJC") creation of
international water boards. These international water boards are an
example of a system that fosters decentralized decision-making,
organized around hydrologic units, such as lakes or rivers, rather than
political or jurisdictional boundaries.
Part III of this Article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages
of having negotiations over transboundary water disputes begin with
regional committees organized at the lowest appropriate hydrological
level. In addition to other advantages and disadvantages, Part III
12. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L.
No. 110-342, § 2.1, 122 Stat. 3739, 3744 (2008). The Council, created by the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, has broad
responsibilities for carrying out that Compact. Id.
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analyzes the potential effectiveness of this approach in fostering
long-term cooperation, gathering accurate data, and promoting public
participation.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT
Access to water is essential to sustain life. It is also essential for
countless other activities - from industrial processes to recreation.
Today, the United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF") and the
World Health Organization ("WHO") estimate that 1.1 billion people
in the world lack safe drinking water, and 2.4 billion people lack
adequate sanitation facilities.' 3 Given the need and varied distribution
of supply, "continuing water shortage tends to aggravate the potential
of conflicts on water allocation between various non-state actors,
such as ethnic and social groups or economic stakeholders, on the
local, national but also on the transboundary level and may thus
destabilise societies and even regions as a whole." 4 While the overall
amount of freshwater is adequate, its distribution on the earth is
uneven.15  As a result, transboundary water resources must be
managed, in order to ensure long-term sustainability of the precious
resource.
In order to promote sustainable management of resources, the
international community has addressed both the general need for
cooperation in managing resources, and the specific need to
cooperate in the management of transboundary water resources. The
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, approved by delegates from 178
nations at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in 1992, addressed the general need for cooperation in
managing resources. 16 Both the United Nations and the International
13. KNUT BOURQUAIN, FRESHWATER ACCESS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE: A CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
1 (2008).
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 5.
16. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/documents/gal
confl5 1/aconfl5126-lannexl .htm; See generally United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21:
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Law Association have addressed the specific need for cooperation in
the management of transboundary water resources.17 The United
Nations, in 1997, adopted the Watercourses Convention, described as
a "codification and progressive development of rules of international"
water law.18 The International Law Association, in 2004, published
the Berlin Rules on Water Resources, touted as "a summary of the
modern customary international law applicable to fresh water
resources." 19 All three - the Berlin Rules,20 the Rio Declaration21
and the Watercourses Convention - stress the importance of
23 24fostering long-term cooperation, gathering accurate data, and
promoting public participation for successful transboundary water
25
management. Future model agreements should also include the
creation of regional committees, organized around hydrologic units,
empowered to anticipate and solve disputes over transboundary water
resources.
The United Nations Programme ofAction from Rio, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 151/26
(1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/ agenda21/.
17. See Int'l Law Ass'n [ILA], Berlin Conference: Water Resources Law,
Fourth Report, at art. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Berlin Rules], available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/32; U. N. Convention on the
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. Res.
51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/869 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Watercourses
Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/8_3_ 1997.pdf; Rio Declaration, supra note 16.
18. Watercourses Convention, supra note 17, at art. 2; see also BOURQUAIN,
supra note 13, at 18.
19. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 'INT'L LAW Ass'N WATER RES. COMM, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION'S BERLIN RULES ON WATER RESOURCES 1,
available at intranet. iucn.org/webfiles/ftp/public/ForumEvents/E1121/
Final%20Document/IUCN%20-%2OBerlin%2ORules%201ntroduction.doc (last
visited Feb. 19, 2011).
20. Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 4.
21. Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at Annex I.
22. See Watercourses Convention, supra note 17.
23. See Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 11; Watercourses Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 8; Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 7.
24. See Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 2; Watercourses Convention, supra
note 17, at art. 9; Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 9.
25. Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 2; Watercourses Convention, supra note
17, at art. 32; Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 10. For a more detailed
discussion of the Watercourses Convention, see infra n. 75.
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A. Long-Term Cooperation
Fostering long-term cooperation is a major theme of the Berlin
Rules, 26 the Rio Declaration, 27 and the Watercourses Convention.28
Two well-known theories-the tragedy of the commons and the
prisoner's dilemma--demonstrate why mutual cooperation is
beneficial over the long term.
The tragedy of the commons was first described by Garret Hardin,
who illustrated his idea with the example of a rational herdsman,
using a common grazing area, deciding whether to get a new cow for
his herd.29  Obtaining a new cow has a positive impact on the
herdsman, all of the benefits of cow ownership, and a negative
impact on the common grazing area, a reduction in the total amount
of grass. The herdsman gets all of the positive impact, the new cow,
but the negative impact, grass depletion, is shared by everyone who
uses the common grazing area. Because the negative impact is
shared, the rational herdsman will always add a cow, a decision that,
26. Berlin Rules, supra note 17, art. 11. Article 11 of the Berlin Rules reads as
follows: "Basin States shall cooperate in good faith in the management of waters of
an international drainage basin for the mutual benefit of the participating States."
Id.
27. Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 7. Principle 7 of the Rio
Declaration reads as follows:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of
the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States
have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place
on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources
they command. Id.
28. Watercourses Convention, supra note 17, at art. 8. Article 8 of the
Watercourses Convention reads as follows:
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 2. In
determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as
deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures
and procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in
existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions. Id.
29. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968).
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in the end, "brings ruin to all." 30 When managing natural resources,
there is pressure to use the resources because of "the belief that if one
were to conserve the common-pool resources, others will take what
was conserved, and the [common pool resource] will still degrade." 31
Solving this dilemma in the international context is particularly
difficult because it requires states to cooperate. 32
The same principle is illustrated by the "prisoner's dilemma." 33
The prisoner's dilemma imagines that two people are being
investigated for a crime.34 Under the imagined scenario, they have
three options. First, if neither of them confesses, there is insufficient
evidence for a conviction and they both go free. 35 Second, if only
one of them confesses, and implicates the other, he will et a $500
reward. His silent cohort will have to pay a $5,000 fine.3 Third, if
both of them confess, each will only have to pay a $1,000 fine. The
prisoners are separated and can't work together.3 7
Game theorists propose that the inevitable result of this dilemma is
38that both of the prisoners will talk, and pay a $1,000 fine. Why?
Each of them, because they can't coordinate their actions, has two
incentives to talk. First, if he talks, and the other doesn't, he receives
$500.39 Second, if he doesn't talk, and the other does, he has to pay
$5,000. In the end, both of them talk, even though it would be better
for both of them to cooperatively maintain their silence. 4 0 When
applied to environmental resources, "the strategy of 'claiming
innocence' is renamed 'sustainable use,' and the strategy of
30. Id.
31. STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ECONOMICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 123 (M.E. Sharpe,
3d. ed. 2006).
32. For a discussion of potential solutions to this tragedy, see Lee Anne Fennell,
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (U. Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin & Econ.
Working Paper No. 457 (2d Series), Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
261, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1348267.
33. HACKETT,supra note 31, at 123.
34. Id. at 124.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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'confessing' is renamed 'resource depletion."' 41 While applying the
prisoner's dilemma to the "real world" is complex, it provides a
simple but compelling example of why bilateral water agreements are
mutually beneficial over the long term.42
The prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons illustrate
the need for states to coordinate their actions over the long term.
Given their need to coordinate, however, begs the question of how
they will actually do so. Professor Andrew Guzman presents a useful
theory for understanding this coordination, focusing on the "[t]hree
Rs:" reputation, reciprocal non-compliance, and retaliation. 43 As
Professor Guzman argues, a noncompliant state's "international legal
obligations may suffer because it finds it more difficult to make
credible international commitments or benefit from international law
in the future (reputation); because other states terminate their own
compliance (reciprocity); or because other states punish it, even when
doing so is costly (retaliation)."44 Each of the three-reputation,
reciprocal non-compliance, and retaliation- applies to
transboundary water disputes.
Reputation, the first "R," is essential to transboundary water
management because there is no international enforcement agency.45
States enter into agreements with the goal of "maximizing their joint
payoffs."46 One of the reasons that states will comply with their
agreements is because they want to maintain their reputation so they
can enter into other agreements in the future.47 As Professors Eric
Posner and Jack Goldsmith explain, "[s]tates with good institutions
comply with treaties even when it is against their immediate interest,
because by complying with treaties against this interest they avoid the
inference that they are unreliable and instead reveal the quality of
their institutions and attract future cooperative partners."4 8
4 1. Id.
42. For a more detailed analysis of the prisoner's dilemma and its implications
for environmental law, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43 (2005).
43. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY 211 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).
44. Id. at 211.
45. See id. at 35.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 42, at 101.
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Reciprocity, the second "R," is most effective in the bilateral
context and "is often sufficient to generate cooperation in the
prisoner's dilemma."4 9  The Boundary Waters Treaty provides a
useful example of the impact of reciprocity in the context of
transboundary water management. The Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909,50 entered into by the United States and Canada, regulates the
diversion of water.51 The Treaty is a particularly good example
because it has "all the features" of a prisoner's dilemma.52
Specifically, both the United States and Canada had incentive to
divert water, but, because doing so would hurt their long-term
interests, a decision to cooperate and not divert the water benefitted
both sides.53
The well-known Trail Smelter arbitration provides another
compelling example of the usefulness of reciprocity in resolving
disputes over transboundary water resources. 54 This arbitration
involved a claim that the United States was damaged by sulfur
dioxide that crossed the border after being emitted from a smelter in
Canada. 5 A tribunal that was setup to hear the case articulated the
principle of reciprocity, noting that both countries have an interest
because "while the United States' interests may now be claimed to be
injured by the operations of a Canadian corporation, it is equally
possible that at some time in the future Canadian interests might be
claimed to be injured by an American corporation." 56
Retaliation, the third "R," is another useful enforcement tool.
Professors Posner and Goldsmith use the example of a treaty aimed at
preventing overfishing to illustrate the concept of retaliation. Two
states enter into a treaty that requires each to limit their fishing to a
sustainable yield. One of the incentives for complying with the
49. GUZMAN, supra note 43, at 42.
50. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 STAT.
2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1938 and 1941),
reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
55. Id. at 1917.
56. See id. at 1938-39; see also Karin Michelson, Rereading Trail Smelter, 31
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 219, 228-29 (1993).
57. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 42, at 100.
2010] 9
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agreement is that, if they don't, the other state may retaliate by
overfishing, "and the cooperative surplus will be dissipated."5 8
Retaliation, then, provides a powerful incentive for compliance.
Long-term cooperation over the management of transboundary
water resources is, therefore, mutually beneficial. As outlined in
greater detail below, resolving transboundary water disputes at the
watershed level promotes long-term cooperation by ensuring that the
reciprocity, reputation, and retaliation is linked to the water resource
at issue, and not to other on-going disputes, unrelated to the resource.
B. Long-Term Studies
Gathering accurate data and improving scientific understanding is
another major theme of the Berlin Rules,59 the Rio Declaration,60 and
the Watercourses Convention. 6 1 Hydrologic studies are essential to
5 8. Id.
59. Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 2. Article 2 reads as follows: "States
shall undertake educational and research programs as necessary to assure the
technical capacity necessary for State and communal authorities to fulfill the
obligations specified in this Chapter and in other Rules." Id. Article 39 reads as
follows:
In order to comply with this Chapter, States shall take all appropriate steps
to acquire the information necessary to manage groundwater and aquifers
efficiently and effectively, including: a. Monitoring groundwater levels,
pressures, and quality; b. Developing aquifer vulnerability maps; c.
Assessing the impacts on groundwater and aquifers of industrial,
agricultural, and other activities; and d. Any other measures appropriate to
the circumstances of the aquifer. Id.
60. Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 9. Principle 9 reads as follows:
"States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for
sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges
of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development,
adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative
technologies." Id.
61. Watercourses Convention, supra note 17, at art. 9. Article 9 reads as
follows:
1. Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis
exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological,
hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to the water quality as
well as related forecasts. 2. If a watercourse State is requested by another
watercourse State to provide data or information that is not readily
available, it shall employ its best efforts to comply with the request but
may condition its compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the
[VOL. XXII
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managing water resources.62 First, reducing uncertainty through
hydrologic data gathering may assist in resolving disputes. 63 Second,
hydrologic information is a key factor in tailoring effective water-
management policy in order to ensure sustainability over the long
run.M Both concepts are best illustrated with examples.
A Michigan case, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v.
Nestld Waters North America,65 illustrates the importance of
understanding the hydrologic connections in a watershed. In 2002,
Nestl6, a bottled water company, began pumping groundwater at a
rate of 400 gallons per day. 66 A citizens group sued to prevent the
pumping, arguing that the pumping was reducing water levels in
nearby bodies of water.67 The trial court determined that the
withdrawals were unreasonable, violating Michigan's common law as
well as Michigan's Environmental Protection Act (MEPA).68 The
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but determined
that the trial court had applied the wrong standard.69 Under the
appropriate standard, according to the appeals court, 400 gallons per
reasonable costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing such
data or information. 3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts
to collect and, where appropriate, to process data and information in a
manner which facilitates its utilization by the other States to which it is
communicated. Id.
62. See, e.g., Jacob Burke, Marcus Moench, & Claude Sauveplan, Groundwater
and Society: Problems in Variability and Points of Engagement, in WORLD BANK
TECHNICAL PAPER No. 456, GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES
41-42 (Salman M.A. Salman ed., 1999).
63. See, e.g., JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND
TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 78 (2009).
64. See, e.g., H.M. GREGERSEN, P.F. FFOLLIOTr, & KENNETH N. BROOKS,
INTEGRATED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT: CONNECTING PEOPLE TO THEIR LAND
AND WATER xii (2007).
65. 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters N. Am., Inc., 737 N.W.2d
447 (Mich. 2007).
66. Michigan Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 184.
67. Nestl Waters, 737 N.W.2d 447.
68. Michigan Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 185-86.
69. The Court of Appeals upheld the claim, but specifically noted that the trial
court "applied the wrong law" in its decision. Id. at 209. The appropriate standard,
according to the Michigan Court of Appeals, was whether the "proposed
withdrawal of water from Sanctuary Springs in the amount of 400 gpm will
unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs' riparian water rights in the Dead Stream."
Id. at 207.
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minute was unreasonable but a lower amount would be reasonable as
70
long as plaintiffs had an adequate supply for their own uses.
The difficulty for the Michigan Court of Appeals was determining
what withdrawal level was reasonable. 7 ' The appeals court found
that, because of the "complexity of the water system at issue" it
needed to remand to the trial court the "daunting task of determining
what level of water extraction" was acceptable. 72 On appeal, the
Michigan Supreme Court added a new twist, upholding the
determination with respect to some of the waters at issue, 73 but
determining that the citizens group had no standing with respect to
other waters. 74 Specifically, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the environmental group had standing for the bodies of water they
abutted against, but not for the other water bodies.7 5 A more recent
case decided by the Michigan Supreme Court has changed the state's
standing analysis. Regardless, in the end Nestl6 and the citizens
group reached a settlement, agreeing to a rate of 218 gallons per
minute.77
The Nestld case illustrates one reason why watershed studies are
imperative for managing water resources. Specifically, in this case, it
70. Id. at 209 (writing, "[bjecause of the paucity of findings directly on point
and the complexity of the water system at issue, we are unable to determine on
appeal what level of pumping from Sanctuary Springs is reasonable under the
circumstances. Therefore, we must remand this issue for determination by the trial
court").
71. Id. at 208-09.
72. Id.
73. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters N. Am., Inc., 737
N.W.2d 447,456 (Mich. 2007).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Lansing Schools Educ. Ass'ns, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., No.
138401, 2010 WL 3037733 (Mich. July 31, 2010). In Lansing Board of Education,
the Michigan Supreme Court determined that its standing analysis should be
"restored to a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan's long-
standing historical approach to standing." Id. at *8. The dissenting opinion noted
that the "[i]n overruling numerous cases, the majority throws into question the
analyses and results in no fewer than eight significant, precedent-setting disputes
including: Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America
Inc . . ." Id. at *15 (emphasis in original).
77. George Weeks, Op-Ed., Op-Ed: Group claims water victory, TRAVERSE
Crry REC.-EAGLE, July 11, 2009, http://record-eagle.com/columns/xl048593264/
Op-Ed-Group-claims-water-victory.
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was difficult for the court to determine how much water Nestl6 could
withdraw without negatively impacting other users. One of the
reasons that this determination was not easy was because there was
uncertainty about the connection between groundwater and surface
water. Engaging in more watershed studies might reduce that
uncertainty and make it easier for the court to apply the relevant law,
permitting withdrawal of the water as long as it does not
unreasonably interfere with the riparian water rights of other users.
The trial court, for example, noted that it is important to "look at as
long a range of information as is available to 'flatten the curve' of
short-term anomalies, such as unusually high precipitation periods."78
The appeals court also quoted one of the experts who expressed the
difficulty of determining the impact of withdrawals because "'no
model . . . can adequately describe the complex interactions between
surface water and groundwater."' 79
The second need, ensuring the long-term sustainability of the
resource, is illustrated by the San Pedro River Basin, a basin shared
by the United States and Mexico and home to around 115,000
people. A 1999 New York Times story reported that, because of
excessive groundwater pumping, the San Pedro River Basin was in
danger of drying up. A little more than a decade earlier, a
University of Arizona professor determined that groundwater
pumping was significantly reducing the flow of the river, in contrast
to earlier models that were based on the false assumption that the
river could never go dry.82 This determination, which led to a number
of heated political disputes, has been confirmed by numerous other
studies.83
The studies, identifying the threat to the ecosystem as a whole from
the groundwater withdrawals, have spurred numerous efforts to
78. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters N. Am., Inc., 709
N.W.2d 174, 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation in original).
79. Id. at 188 (omission in original).
80. Anne Browning-Aiken et al., Integrating Science and Policy for Water
Management: A Case Study of the Upper San Pedro River Basin, in Hydrology and
Water Law - Bridging the Gap 24, 27 (J. Wallace & P. Wouters eds., 2006).
81. Jon Christensen, In Arizona Desert, a Bird Oasis in Peril, N.Y. Times, May
4, 1999, at F5.
82. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 54-55 (2002).
83. For a discussion of the political disputes, see supra notes 51-69 and
accompanying text.
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ensure the long-term sustainability of the river.84 Understanding the
connection is key to tailoring effective solutions that do not either
under- or over-regulate the resource. It is also necessary to identify
when a problem exists in the first place. As Professor Glennon
explains:
As groundwater pumping increases, we, as humans, suffer
the costs. If you place a frog into a pot of cold water on the
stove, then turn on the heat and increase it gradually, the
frog won't know enough to jump from the pot. The heated
water will eventually kill the frog. With groundwater
pumping, we may not notice the changes as they slowly
occur over years. Stark consequences-such as rivers that
dry up-are apparent. In contrast, pumping that causes a
gradual decline in the number of birds, butterflies, fish, or
trees diminishes our enjoyment of the resource in
imperceptible steps. 8 6
Long-term studies are integral to ensuring sustainability of water
resources. As described in greater detail below, organizing studies at
the watershed level assists in developing an understanding of the
system as a whole.8 7 Likewise, addressing disputes at the local level
ensures that the information, local expertise, and value judgments are
part of the solution. A recent study of the San Pedro River Basin,
for example, concludes that "[c]ollaborative research based on water-
stakeholders' needs is far more effective in addressing complex
management of a basin . . . than when scientists work on the same
problem in different places." 89 One of the advantages of empowering
local cross-border cooperation is ensuring collaborative research
based on the needs of water-stakeholders. 90
84. For example, a "program to reestablish beavers" has been instituted,
because of their positive impact on river restoration. See GLENNON, supra note 82,
at 67.
85. See id. at 68-69.
86. Id. at 10.
87. See discussion infra pp. 33, 36-37.
88. See discussion infra pp. 33, 36.
89. Browning-Aiken et al., supra note 80, at 52.
90. EDWARD LIEBOW et al., EvNTL. HEALTH & SOC. POL'Y CTR., PERSPECTIVES
ON THE HIGH Ross TREATY, PHASE ONE OF THE SKAGIT ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 4
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C. Public Participation
Promoting public participation at the "relevant level" is another
important principle of international transboundary water law.91 The
Rio Declaration, for example, says that "[e]nvironmental issues are
best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level."9 2 This has two important components: first, why is
(2003), available at http://skagiteec.org/skagit-research-library/sp-files/00002f9d
.pdf/atdownload/file.
91. See, e.g., Berlin Rules, supra note 17, at art. 4 (mandating that "[s]tates shall
take steps to assure that persons likely to be affected are able to participate in the
processes whereby decisions are made concerning the management of waters.").
While it is only "slightly elaborated" by the U.N. Watercourse Convention,
Professor Laurence Boisson de Chaszournes, Head of the Department of
International Law at the University of Geneva, suggests that it represents the "fifth
pillar" of the Convention. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Role of
Diplomatic Means of Solving Water Disputes: A Special Emphasis on Institutional
Mechanisms, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 91, 96 (The
Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct. of Arb. ed., 2003). He argues that the reason it is
not a more formidable part of the Watercourses Convention is because the
Watercourses Convention is a "state-oriented instrument." Id. The slight
elaboration occurs in Article 32, stating that:
[u]nless the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have
suffered or are under a serious threat of suffering significant
transboundary harm as a result of activities related to an international
watercourse, a watercourse State shall not discriminate on the basis of
nationality or residence or place where the injury occurred, in granting to
such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access to judicial or
other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief in
respect of significant harm caused by such activities carried on in its
territory. Watercourses Convention, supra note 17, at art. 32.
92. Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 10. The full text of Principle 10
reads as follows:
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is
held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials
and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making information widely available.
Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including
redress and remedy, shall be provided. Id.
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public participation important, and second, what is the "relevant
level?"
Public participation is justified for at least two reasons. First,
public participation in water management decisions is "more
democratic" than resource decisions without such participation:9 3
Fostering public participation is more democratic because it increases
the likelihood of having an informed and engaged public and
enhances the accountability of decision-makers. 94 Second, public
participation leads to better environmental decisions.9 5  Obviously,
scientific and diplomatic expertise plays a role in management of
transboundary water resources. However, in addition to expertise,
public participation enhances decision-making by allowing important
input from non-experts. 96 Local residents, for example, "might be in a
better position to present information about the local impacts of a
decision." 97 In addition, participation helps to ensure that local values
98
are incorporated into decisions about resources.
Determining the "relevant level" has sparked debate. 99 There is
disagreement in the United States, for example, about whether
centralized or decentralized decision-making is appropriate.' 00 There
are several arguments favoring centralized decision-making. First,
centralized decision-making may avoid the potential for a "race to the
bottom." Centralized regulation avoids this pitfall by applying
93. William Howarth, Aspirations and Realities Under the Water Framework
Directive: Proceduralisation, Participation, and Practicalities, 21 J. ENVTL. L.
391,399(2009).
94. Noah D. Hall, The Evolving Role of Citizens in the United States-Canadian
International Environmental Law Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 150
(2007).
95. Howarth, supra note 93, at 399. See also, Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of Third
Parties in Promoting Collective Action Among Riparians, in RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 201, 226 (The Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Ct.
of Arb. ed., 2003) (noting that "[p]ublic participation has been widely recognized
as being crucial for responsible decision-making.").
96. Howarth, supra note 93, at 399-400.
97. Id. at 399.
98. Id. The race to the bottom hypothesis theorizes that states, in their zeal to
compete, are likely to under-regulate in order to increase their competitiveness.
Hall, supra note 94, at 134 n. 11.
99. Richard B. Stewart, Introduction: Environmental Regulation in Multi-
Jurisdictional Regimes, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1, 10-13 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000).
100. See id. at 10.
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regulation equally to all states. Second, centralized regulation is
useful in order to deal with inter-state externalities. 01 For example,
in order to avoid pollution costs, one state might build a huge
smokestack to increase the likelihood that the smoke spews over the
border to a neighboring state. Centralized regulation could avoid this
problem by prohibiting states from building such tall stacks. Third,
environmental interests are often underrepresented at the local level
and centralized regulation may improve environmental protection by
ensuring that a broad spectrum of interests is represented.10 2
While centralized regulation has some advantages, Professor Adler
suggests that, in the United States, there are several "policy reasons
to support a general [but rebuttable] presumption in favor of state and
local responsibility for environmental concerns." 03 First, the
Constitution's structure of reserving non-enumerated powers to the
states "suggests a principle of 'subsidiarity' - the principle that
problems should be addressed at the lowest level at which they can be
practically addressed." 0 4 Second, over-centralized approaches to
environmental regulation are inflexible and do not adequately
account for local environmental conditions.105 Third, approaching
environmental problems at the local level increases the ability of
regulators to rely on local knowledge and expertise, which often is
not available at the federal level.'0o Fourth, local and state
responsibility for environmental concerns promotes innovative
solutions to environmental problems.' 07 For example, states may
approach similar problems in different ways and, as such, act as
"laboratories" for innovative solutions. 08 Fifth, a decentralized
approach increases accountability and allows people to voice their
"subjective value preferences which may be quite variable across the
nation."' 09
101. RICHARD L. REVESZ, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000).
102. Id.
103. Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135 (2005).
104. Id. at 134-35.
105. Id. at 137.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 138.
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As discussed in greater detail below, if negotiations over
transboundary disputes begin at the local watershed level, those with
the greatest stake in the outcome - the ones living in the watershed
- have a voice in the resolution.' Not only is local expertise and
scientific understanding useful in the resolution, it also necessarily
involves value choices. Local watershed dispute resolution increases
the likelihood that resolution of the dispute will reflect value
judgments of the people whose lives are most directly impacted by
the resources.11' Local watershed dispute resolution, therefore,
should be favored. This does not imply, however, that centralized
dispute resolution is displaced entirely, rather that negotiations are
often most effective at the "lowest" appropriate hydrologic level,
even if the dispute is one that crosses borders.
II. TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES
Transboundary water agreements should include a rebuttable
presumption that negotiations over transboundary water disputes
begin with regional committees organized at the "lowest" appropriate
hydrological level. This argument has two components. First, it
requires regional committees to be organized by hydrologic units,
such as watersheds. Second, it requires beginning dispute resolution
with the "lowest"-or most local- hydrologic unit. For example, if
the dispute is over a small border stream that feeds into Lake
Michigan, negotiations would begin with a committee comprised of
stakeholders, from both the United States and Canada, whose lives
are impacted by the stream, as opposed to the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Canada, who are not as directly
impacted.
Two examples below illustrate both components of the argument.
First, a comparison of two case studies, one between the United
States and Canada, and one between the United States and Mexico,
that demonstrate the advantage of approaching transboundary water
disputes at the local level. Second, the experience of the United
States and Canada in employing regional committees demonstrates
the usefulness of such committees in resolving disputes. Together,
these examples demonstrate that a rebuttable presumption that
110. See, infra pp. 30-32.
111. REVESZ, supra note 101, at 11.
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negotiations over transboundary water disputes begin with regional
committees organized at the "lowest" appropriate hydrological level
encourages long-term cooperation, ensures wide-spread public
participation, and enables water-managers to use the best available
hydrologic data to resolve their disputes.
It is important to note, at the outset, that the case studies are useful
examples, but the comparison has its flaws. Mexico is less
economically developed than the United States and Canada, and its
democracy is not as mature.1 12 In addition, the relationship between
the United States and Canada is different from the relationship
between United States and Mexico. As a result, it would not be
possible to make a general conclusion that any one factor is
responsible for the more successful outcome of one dispute, between
the United States and Canada, than the other, between the United
States and Mexico. However, the general conclusions of those
analyzing each of the case studies highlight relevant differences in
the approaches, which enhance the usefulness of the comparison. In
addition, each dispute is analyzed independently with respect to its
likely success in enhancing cooperation, scientific understanding, and
public participation - the key elements of transboundary water
management discussed above.
A. Case #1: U.S.-Mexico and the Mexicali Water Dispute
1. The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty
Three different rivers define various portions of the border between
the United States and Mexico.'" 3 The Rio Grande River (also known
as the Rio Bravo) defines the border for a 1,200-mile stretch between
El Paso, Texas and the Gulf of Mexico. 1 14 The Colorado River
defines the border for a twenty mile stretch along the southern border
of Arizona." 5 The Tijuana River defines the border for a two mile
stretch from the Mexican border town of Tijuana to the Pacific
112. Michael E. Campana, Alyssa M. Neir, & Geoffrey T. Klise, Dynamics of
Transboundary Groundwater Management: Lessons from North America, in
GOVERNANCE AS A TRIALOGUE: GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY-SCIENCE IN TRANSITION
167, 168 (Anthony R. Turton et al. eds., 2007).
113. LEE STACY, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 100 (Lee Stacy ed., 2002).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Ocean.11 6 Together, the three rivers "drain over 430,000 scuare miles
(692,000 sq km) of some of the earth's most arid land."' 7 Disputes
over water allocation have plagued relations between the United
States and Mexico since Mexico's independence from Spain in
1821."' In 1944, to help resolve these disputes, the United States and
Mexico entered into the Mexican Water Treaty, a treaty that
addressed how water from these three rivers should be allocated.' 19
The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty allocates water from each of these
three rivers. 120 The treaty allocates water from the Colorado River by
specifying that Mexico is entitled to at least 1.5 million-acre feet
("MAF"), but no more than 1.7 MAF, of water from the river each
year. 121 The United States, alternatively, is entitled to "the amount
necessary to supply [its] uses" so long as it delivers the 1.5 MAF on
an annual basis. 122 The treaty allocates water from the Rio Grande
River based on the amount of water that enters it from tributaries
flowing out of each country.123 The Treaty also provides for further
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter Mexican
Treaty].
120. Id. at 1220.
121. Id. at art. 10; see also STEPHEN R. VI9A, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS
22085, THE UNITED STATES - MEXIco DIsPuTE OVER THE WATERS OF THE LOWER
RIO GRANDE RIVER 2 (2005), http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/ 05mar/RS22085.
pdf.
122. Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art. 10. The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty
also notes that,
[i]n the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation
system in the United States, thereby making it difficult for the United
States to deliver the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet
(1,850,234,000 cubic meters) a year, the water allotted to Mexico under
subparagraph (a) of this Article will be reduced in the same proportion as
consumptive uses in the United States are reduced. Id.
123. Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art. 4; see also VIRA, supra note 121, at
2. Specifically, the treaty allocates to Mexico the amount of water in the Rio
Grande equivalent to: (1) the amount that flows in from the San Juan and Alamo
Rivers; (2) two-thirds of the water that flows in from the Conchos, San Diego, San
Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo; and (3) fifty-
percent of any additional water that is not allocated. Mexican Treaty, supra note
119, at art. 4. The treaty allocates to the United States: (1) the other one-third that
flows in from Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado Rivers
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study and recommendations for the best allocation of the Tijuana
River.124
2. The International Boundary and Water Commission ("]BWC")
The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty delegated regulation and dispute
settlement responsibilities to the IBWC.125 The IBWC is an
international body comprised of a section from the United States,
overseen by the U.S. Department of State, and a section from
Mexico, overseen by the Mexico Ministry of Foreign Relations.126
The IBWC has the authority to make rules and issue decisions about
the Mexican Water Treaty.' 2 7 These rules and decisions are in the
form of Minutes, which are "legally enforceable and can essentially
amend the Treaty, unless one of the countries objects within thirty
days." 28
3. Introduction to the Mexicali Water Dispute
California has a notoriously scarce water supply.129 In 1901, to
meets its growing need for water, the California Development
Company ("Company") began diverting water from the Colorado
River to California.1 30 Originally, the Company transported the water
to California in a canal that "began in the United States, ran for most
of its length through Mexico, and then recrossed the international
boundary into the Imperial Valley."' 31 Eventually, however, farmers
in the Imperial Valley convinced the federal government to build a
canal located entirely within the United States, aptly named the "All-
and the Las Vacas Arroyo; (2) the amount of water that flows in from the Pecos
and Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring, and Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe and
Pinto Creeks; and (3) fifty-percent of any additional water that is not allocated. Id.
124. Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art. 16.
125. Id. at art. 2.
126. VIlJA, supra note 121, at 2; see also Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art.
2.
127. VI&A, supra note 121, at 2; see also Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art.
2.
128. VNIA, supra note 121, at 2; see also Mexican Treaty, supra note 119, at art.
2.
129. See ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA'S WATER CRISIS AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 254 (2009).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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American Canal." 32 The All-American Canal, completed in 1942,
transported approximately twenty percent of the Colorado River's
annual flow to farmers in the Imperial Valley in California.133 This
water was part of the obligation, pursuant to the Colorado River
Compact of 1922, that states located in the Upper Basin of the
Colorado River (Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming) were
required to deliver to states in the Lower Basin (Arizona, Nevada,
and California).134
The All-American Canal, when it was originally constructed, was
unlined.' 35 According to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, each year
approximately twenty-two billion gallons of water that travels
through the Colorado River in the All-American Canal never reaches
the Imperial Valley because it percolates into the ground.136 From the
perspective of the farmers in the Imperial Valley, the water is "lost"
because it leaves the Colorado River and never arrives in the Imperial
Valley.' 37 From the perspective of Mexican farmers, however, the
water is not lost.138 After seeping into the ground, the groundwater
flows into Mexico and provides much needed water for agricultural,
domestic, and environmental needs on the Mexican side of the
border.139
In 1988, Congress determined that the twenty-two billion gallons
percolating into the ground each year, if it was captured, could help
to both meet the growing need for water in California and settle water
132. Id. at 255.
133. Id. The United States Bureau of Reclamation began building the canal,
which was authorized by the Boulder Canon Project Act of 1928, in 1934 and
completed construction in 1942. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat.
1057 (1928) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (2010)); see also
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007).
134. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, 482 F.3d at 1163.
135. FEREIDOUN GHASSEMI & IAN WHITE, INTER-BASIN WATER TRANSFER:
CASE STUDIES FROM AUSTRALIA, UNITED STATES, CANADA, CHINA, AND INDIA 227
(2007).
136. See GLENNON, supra note 129, at 295.
137. Alyssa M. Neir & Michael E. Campana, The Peaceful Resolution of U.S.-
Mexican Transboundary Water Disputes, 2 ECON. OF PEACE AND SEC. J. 42, 43
(2007).
138. See id.
139. See id
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rights claims brought by Native American groups.14 0 With this in
mind, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to recover
water percolating out of the All-American Canal by either: (1) lining
the canal; (2) constructing a new canal parallel to the existing canal;
or (3) constructing "seepage recovery facilities." 41 In 1994, after
issuing a Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS"), the
Secretary decided to go forward with the second option, constructing
a new lined canal, parallel to the old unlined canal.142
The Secretary's decision to build a lined canal had two diverging
implications. Lining the canal benefited California water-users by
reducing inefficiency in the transfer system and reducing the amount
of water being "lost" in the transfer from the Colorado River to
California.143 However, the water that was "lost" in the transfer also
helped to sustain more than 14,000 farmers in Mexicali, who
depended on the water for their livelihood. 144 As a result of the
potential harms in Mexicali, "[a]n unlikely coalition of farmers,
environmentalists, and business interests in the city of Mexicali,
home to maquiladoras, formed to challenge the lining of the All-
American Canal."145 The coalition brought suit in United States
federal court against the government of the United States, the
Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation. 14 6 The coalition asserted that lining the canal would
adversely impact Mexico through reverberating impacts that would
violate the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the
Endangered Species Act.' 4 7 Specifically, the coalition claimed that in
order to comply with NEPA, the United States Bureau of
Reclamation was required to assess the potential impacts that would
be felt in Mexico before proceeding.14 8
140. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United
States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007).
141. Id.; see San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub.L. No. 100-
675, 102 Stat. 4000, § 203 (1988).
142. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, 482 F.3d at 1164-65.
143. GLENNON, supra note 129, at 296.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 297.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 298.
148. See id.
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a. Lower Court (Environmental Assessment)
With respect to the NEPA claims, the district court separated the
claims into those dealing with potential impacts in Mexico and those
dealing with potential impacts within the United States.14 9 The
district court held that NEPA does not apply to the environmental
impacts of the lining project that are felt in Mexico, holding:
If the environmental impacts fall exclusively within a
foreign jurisdiction or in an area over which the United
States has no legislative control, courts have held NEPA
does not apply... [b]ased on the facts here and absent a clear
statutory intent to the contrary, NEPA does not apply to the
All-American Canal lining project's environmental impacts
in Mexico . .. Although the agency action of constructing
and lining a new section of the All-American Canal will
occur within the United States, the projects' effects on the
Andrade Mesa Wetlands, the Mexican Yuma Clapper Rail
population, the socio-economic situation in Mexico,
groundwater in the Mexicali Valley, seepage flow to the
New River in Mexico, and air quality in Mexico will occur
outside United States territory in Mexico, a sovereign
nation over which Congress lacks legislative control.1 50
The district court dismissed the lawsuit and denied the group's
-151
request for an injunction.
149. See CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, NEPA AND ENvIRONMENTAL PLANNING:
TooLS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPROACHES FOR PRACTITIONERS 156 (CRC Press,
Taylor and Francis Group, 2008) ("The court divided the plaintiffs' allegations into
ones dealing with impacts in Mexico and those with effects within the United
States.").
150. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 1207, 1235 (D. Nev. 2006), vacated and remanded, Consejo de
Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2007).
151. See id
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b. Congress and the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
After the district court dismissed the lawsuit, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and filed for an
injunction pending the outcome of the appeal.15 2 The Ninth Circuit
granted the injunction. 153 Professor Robert Glennon described the
response by the proponents of the canal to the injunction in the
following terms:
[w]ith millions of dollars on the line, 9 percent of San
Diego's future water supply at stake, and a construction
project halted . . . the water users decided to explore other
options. None of these included settling with the plaintiffs.
Instead, they went to Congress. The Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 2006, 279 pages long, contained tax relief
measures and health savings account options for millions of
Americans. The act had nothing to do with water until
December 2006, when California senator Dianne Feinstein,
Nevada senator Harry Reid, and Arizona senator Jon Kyl
attached a last minute rider to the act declaring simply that
"notwithstanding any other provision of law, [the
government] shall, without delay, carry out the All-
American Canal Lining Project." President George W.
Bush signed the law three days after the U.S. court of
appeals heard arguments on the plaintiffs' appeal.154
Congress passed the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,15
legislating that the All-American Canal Lining Project go forward
after the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on the merits of the
appeal in December of 2006, but before they rendered their
decision. 156
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 provides that the
exclusive authority for "identifying, considering, analyzing, or
addressing the impacts occurring outside the boundary of the United
152. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, 482 F.3d at 1167.
153. See id.
154. GLENNON, supra note 129, at 298-99; see also Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922.
155. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.
156. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, 482 F.3d at 1167.
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States" is the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty.' The Ninth Circuit
determined that, "[i]n sum, the 2006 Act renders the claims based on
past violations of NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, and the Settlement Act moot." 58
c. The Result
The new canal was completed at the end of April, 2009.159 On
April 30, 2009, officials, including California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, gathered in California to celebrate the official
dedication of the newly finished canal.160 Mexican officials
considered the topic to be a major bi-national concern, second only to
immigration.161
An article published in 2009 analyzed the Mexicali dispute,
including questions posed to Mexicali water users in order to
understand how the legal process was perceived by Mexicali water
uses.162 The article reached two conclusions. First, it concluded that
the approach taken "removed water management discussions from
the local-regional to the national, federal institutional level." 63 The
IBWC, although it is a federal institution, is able to enter into
agreements without coordinating with national agencies.164 The
157. Id. at 1169.
158. Id. at 1174.
159. See Megan Bakker, It's Official: Canal Lining Completed, IMPERIAL
VALLEY PRESS ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2009, http://articles.ivpressonline.com/2009-05-
01/century-old-canal_24165150.
160. See id
161. Tony Perry, Officials Hail $300-million Project to Line Leaky All-American
Canal, LA TIMES BLOG, (May 1, 2009, 11:31 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/lanow/2009/05/water-officials-hail-300-million-project-to-line-leaky-
allamerican-canal.html.
162. See Alfonso A. Cortez Lara, Megan K. Donovan, & Scott Whiteford, The
All-American Canal Lining Dispute: An American Resolution over Mexican
Groundwater Rights?, 21 FRONTERA NORTE 127, 142 (2009), available at
http://aplicaciones.colef.mx:8080/fronteranorte/articulos/FN41/6-f41.pdf. The
questions, posed in early 2008, included: (1) How did you learn about the legal
decision to proceed with the lining of the All-American Canal?; (2) What is your
understanding of how the legal case was resolved?; (3) Do you believe the legal
justifications offered?; (4) How do you think the case would have been resolved if
Congress had not intervened?; (5) How do you explain the decision to water users?
Id.
163. Id at 145.
164. Id.
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article determined that "resolution of the All-American Canal lining
issue in Federal Court not only halted contemporaneous IBWC
dialogue, but also effectively removed the issue from the scope of its
institutional mandate." 65
Second, the ruling by the court "forecloses official compensation
claims against the United States government." 66 Because of this,
according to the article, the ruling might be used by institutions in the
United States to "rebut arguments for compensation."' 6 7 As a result,
the article concluded that the litigation not only failed to achieve its
purpose, it also inadvertently reduced the likelihood of future
"dialogue and cooperation."16 8
While the impact on the farmers is unclear, resolution of the
dispute appears to be sub-optimal with respect to cooperation, public
participation, and scientific information. First, Mexican officials
consider the dispute to be extremely important, second only to
immigration.16 9 The result, in addition to establishing "structural
barriers to future dialogue and cooperation," may fuel retaliation or
lack of reciprocity by Mexico in the future.' 7 0 Second, the dispute
was ultimately settled by a Congressional rider in a tax bill and not
by public participation by those with the most stake in the
controversy.171 In addition to a lack of public participation, it is
arguable that the decision was not made at "the relevant level."
Third, the approach foreclosed any demand for an environmental
impact assessment, which may have found that lining the pond would
have a negligible impact and solve the controversy without the fear
for reduced future cooperation. On the other hand, it might have
found that there was an impact, and alternative solutions could have
been sought.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Tony Perry, Officials Hail $300-million Project to Line Leaky All-American
Canal, LA TIMEs BLOG, (May 1, 2009, 11:31 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com
/lanow/2009/05/water-officials-hail-300-million-project-to-line-leaky-allamerican-
canal.html.
170. Cortez Lara, Donovan, & Whiteford, supra note 162, at 145.
171. GLENNON, supra note 129, at 298-99; see also Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922.
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B. Case #2: U.S.-Canada and the "High Ross Dam"l 72
1. The Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint
Commission ("IJC")
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 established the International
Joint Commission ("IJC").'73  Under the Boundary Waters Treaty,
the UC serves judicial, investigatory, and administrative functions.
The IJC may adjudicate any matter voluntarily given to it by the
governments of the United States and Canada.174 The IJC serves an
investigatory role by carrying out studies and making
recommendations.'7 5 The IJC also has administrative functions by,
for example, making determinations about measuring and
apportioning water from rivers.' 76
2. Introduction
The Skagit River flows from the Canadian province of British
Columbia, across the border, into the state of Washington.' 7 7 The
River provides electricity for the city of Seattle, Washington.' 8 The
original efforts to harness electricity from the Skagit River were
initiated by James D. Ross, who took over as superintendant of
Seattle's public electric utility in 1911.179 The electric utility, Seattle
172. The project is referred to as the "High Ross Dam" and the "High Ross Dam
Controversy." UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT:
RELEVANT PRACTICE FOR IMPROVED DECISION MAKING 115, 121 (2007),
http://www.unep.org/dams/files/compendium/compendium.pdf.
173. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 50, at art. III.
174. Id. at art. X; INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 318 (Patricia K. Wouters ed., 1997).
175. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 50, at art. IX; INTERNATIONAL WATER
LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 318 (Patricia K.
Wouters ed., 1997).
176. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 50, at art. VI; INTERNATIONAL WATER
LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 318 (Patricia K.
Wouters ed., 1997).
177. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83; see also RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR. &
DWIGHT D DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 294
(1994).
178. ZERBE, JR. & DIVELY, supra note 177, at 294.
179. THE SKAGIT EVNTL. ENDOWMENT COMM'N, PROTECTING AN
INTERNATIONAL WATERSHED 4 (2008), available at http://skagiteec.org/skagit-
research-library/sp-files/2008-seec-outreach-presentation/atdownload/file.
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Light Company, began constructing the High Ross Dam in 1937. so
Construction of the first phase of the High Ross Dam, finished in
1940, created the Ross Lake reservoir, which backs up into British
Columbia.18'
The "High Ross Dam Controversy" arose when the Seattle Light
Company decided that it needed to raise the height of the dam in
order to meet its growing need for energy.182 The Seattle Light
Company estimated that raising the dam sufficiently to meet its
additional electricity requirements of 241 megawatts183 would flood
approximately 5,475 acres of recreational land in British
Columbia.184 Under Article IV of the Canada-U.S Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, the United States and Canada cannot construct dams
if the effect of the dam would be to "raise the natural level of waters
on the other side of the boundary" without permission of the IJC. 85
Pursuant to the treaty, the Seattle Light Company applied to the IJC
for approval to raise the dam.1 86
3. The IJC's Approval to Raise the Dam
In 1942, the UC issued an order permitting the city of Seattle to
raise the height of the dam in stages, on the condition that Seattle
would compensate British Columbia for the land that was flooded. 87
The High Ross Dam was raised to its present level in the early
1950s.' In 1967, Seattle and British Columbia entered into an
agreement to raise the height of the dam again.189 The agreement
permitted Seattle to raise the dam and flood approximately 5,000
more pristine acres of land in British Columbia in exchange for an
180. LIEBOw et al., supra note 90, at 3.
181. Id.
182. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 50, at art. IV.
186. LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 3.
187. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83; see also Alper & Monahan, supra note 6,
at 164; LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 3. The order by the IJC also: (1) indicated
that the IJC "reserved [the] right to review [the] negotiated agreement and manage
water levels as needed;" and (2) "created [the] International Skagit River Board of
Control to provide technical advice to the IJC." Id.
188. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 164.
189. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83; see also Alper & Monahan, supra note 6,
at 164; LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 3.
2010]1 29
30 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
annual rent payment of $34,566.190 The agreement was valid because
it met the requirements of the 1942 order by the IJC.191
In the early 1970s, environmental concerns led to a shift in public
opinion, which resulted in opposition on "both sides of the border."' 92
In 1974, British Columbia "officially proclaimed its opposition to the
flooding and asked the IJC to void its 1942 order which also would
have had the effect of invalidating the 1967 compensation
agreement." 93 The UC refused to rescind the order but noted that it
has "continuing jurisdiction."194
4. Negotiating a Settlement
Unlike typical negotiations over international water disputes,
which take place between representatives from the national level of
government, negotiations in this case occurred between
representatives from Seattle, a city, and representatives from British
Columbia, a province.' 95 Initially, the negotiations were fruitless
because both sides "defined [the issue] in zero-sum terms-if one
side won, the other lost; if the dam is raised the valley is lost."'1
96
Seattle argued that under the 1942 IJC order, it had the legal right to
raise the dam.197 British Columbia claimed that the 1942 UC order
was no longer relevant because it was made during World War II and
the valley should be preserved.198
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the negotiations
began to bear fruit. At least three factors contributed to the shift.199
First, the parties began to shift their focus away from a "zero-sum"
analysis-raising or not raising the dam-to focusing on the needs of
each party, protecting the valley and obtaining electricity. 200 Second,
190. Id. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83; see also Alper & Monahan, supra note
6, at 164; LIEBoW et al., supra note 90, at 3.
191. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 164.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. LIEBoW et al., supra note 90, at 55.
195. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 163; LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 57-
58.
196. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 165.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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rising energy prices "gave new urgency to settling the High Ross
Dam issue."201' Third, in 1982, the UC appointed a Joint Consultative
202Group to help ensure the parties would negotiate a solution. The
Group was comprised of, "a member of the Commission from each
country, representatives of the two national governments, British
Columbia and Seattle, and two independent technical advisors." 203
The IJC also put pressure on the parties to reach a settlement.204
On June 28, 1984, the United States and British Columbia
signed the Skagit River treaty,205 settling the forty-two year dispute
between the two parties.20 6 The solution required that, in exchange
for not raising the dam, Seattle would get power from Canada "at a
price equivalent to what the power would have cost Seattle had it sold
bonds and built the higher dam." 207 The treaty also established a fund
to "enhance recreational trails and facilities in the Canadian and U.S.
portions of the Skagit Valley." 208
5. The Result
Unlike the Mexicali resolution, the resolution of the High Ross
Dam controversy encouraged future cooperation, involved public
input from those who would be impacted by the decision, and relied
on a detailed environmental impact assessment. Two studies
completed after the resolution of the controversy illustrate each of
these points. Professors Alper and Monahan completed a study of
Skagit River treaty209 in which they highlighted several "lessons
learned." 2 10 In addition to this, an Oral History Project highlighted
several "key themes" learned from the controversy, based on
211interviews from those who were involved in the negotiations.
First, the resolution of the High Ross Dam controversy encouraged
future cooperation. Successful resolution of the controversy lessens
201. Id.
202. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 83.
203. Id.
204. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 165-66.
205. Skagit River Treaty, supra note 2.
206. B.C. Treaty Settles Seattle Dam Dispute, supra note 4, at 3.
207. Id.
208. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 84.
209. See Skagit River Treaty, supra note 2.
210. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 170.
211. LIEBOw et al., supra note 90, at 4.
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the likelihood of retaliation, and increases the likelihood of
reciprocity, in future arrangements. One of the lessons learned was
that "a significant contribution to the resolution of regional cross
border conflict may be the addition of benefits which go beyond the
specific issues in contention."2 12 In this case, for example, the
negotiations led to the creation of an "Environmental Endowment
Plan" which fosters future cooperation by, among other things,
creating a "unique international park" in the Skagit Valley.213 On the
flip side, as Professors Alper and Monahan concluded, "local
disputes often get caught up in a much broader process of bilateral
negotiation which causes the local problem to be pushed aside so as
not to threaten other objectives." 214 The approach taken with the
High Ross Dam controversy avoided this potential pitfall.
Second, the resolution involved public input. Another lesson
learned was that "negotiators need to recognize the importance of
effective communication with relevant constituencies and levels of
government." 215 Critical to this determination was the importance of
public buy-in from a range of groups, including the press, interest
216groups, and governments. Likewise, a key theme that emerged
from the Oral History Project was that the "narratives [of those
interviewed] demonstrate dramatically that public participation can
play a constructive role in decisions made on behalf of the public
interest."217
Third, the resolution relied on studies and local technical
knowledge and expertise. Another of the lessons learned was that
"cross border issues should be dealt with at the local or regional level
insofar as is possible." 218 Critical to this determination was the
finding that "the greatest amount of knowledge about regional issues
are found at this level." 219 Another lesson was that "the availability of
212. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 171.
213. Id.; see also Donald K. Alper, Trans-boundary Environmental Governance
in the Pacific West, in CANANDA INSTITUTE: OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES,
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE ON THE 49TH PARALLEL: NEW CENTURY, NEW
APPROACHES 133, 138-39 (2010), available at wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/
IJC%20FINAL.pdf.
214. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 170.
215. Id. at 171.
216. Id.
217. LIEBOw et al., supra note 90, at 4.
218. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 170.
219. Id.
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impartial fact finders who are mutually respected aids the negotiation
process."220 The use of such fact finders increases the likelihood of
"[c]reative and far-sighted solutions."22 1 Likewise, one of the key
themes that emerged was that "abstract scientific knowledge must be
complemented by an experiential knowledge of place. This
experiential knowledge is not clearly distinct from scientific
knowledge - the two inform and influence each other to create a
more richly textured public wisdom." 222  In other words, local
scientific knowledge is the most powerful.
The result, as previously noted, led to a solution that President
Reagan described as being "constructively and ingeniously settled" 223
and Canadian Intergovernmental Relations Minister Garde Gardom
said was "an environmental victory [which] makes economic
sense." 224
C. The Watershed Approach in Transboundary Water
Management
In order to ensure that negotiations begin at the appropriate level,
transboundary water agreements should create regional committees,
centered on the hydrologic unit. Likewise, in the absence of a formal
agreement, negotiators trying to resolve transboundary disputes
should take advantage of such organizations if they exist. Recent
experience from the United States and Canada has found that regional
committees organized around watersheds have been successful.
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the "watershed
approach" to water management. 225 The watershed approach "uses
hydrologically defined areas (watersheds) to coordinate the
management of water resources." 226 Typically, the "hydrologically
defined area" is a "watershed," and is defined as the area of land that
"drains into a single body of water such as a stream, lake, wetland, or
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. LIEBOw et al., supra note 90, at 3.
223. B.C. Treaty Settles Seattle Dam Dispute, supra note 4, at 3.
224. McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 84.
225. COMM. ON WATERSHED MGMT., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, NEW STRATEGIES
FOR AMERICA'S WATERSHEDS 33 (Nat'1 Acad. Press, 1999).
226. OFF. OF WATER, EPA, PROTECTING AND RESTORING AMERICA'S
WATERSHEDS: STATUS, TRENDS, AND INITIATIVES IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
10 (2001), http://www.epa.gov/owow/protecting/restore725.pdf.
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estuary." 227 Depending on the size of the body of water, watersheds
might be large or small, and they are "nested" - meaning that
smaller watersheds are contained within larger watersheds. 228
The Environmental Protection Agency recognizes three "guiding
principles" integral to the watershed a proach.229 First, the watershed
approach has a "geographic focus." 30 Management focuses on a
geographic area, typically a watershed, rather than political or
jurisdictional boundaries.231 Second, the watershed approach involves
"partnerships," in which the stakeholders that use the water in the
geographically defined area are involved in the decision-making. 23 2
In this way, the approach recognizes the many different needs for
water - hydropower, recreation, habitat support, navigation, water
supply, etc. 233 Third, the stakeholders within the geographically
defined area employ scientific techniques to understand the
watershed and base their management decisions on "strong science
and data."234 The approach uses information from both social
sciences and physical sciences.235 The goal is for the approach to
integrate, "biological, hydrological, chemical, economic, and social
consideration into decision-making." 236
One of the best ways to understand the watershed approach is
to focus on the fragmented approach that it replaces, which has been
described as follows:
The United States has developed separate laws for clean
water, clean air, fertile soils, productive fisheries, healthy
forests and robust communities. It created separate
agencies to administer those laws as federal, state, and local
levels and on public and private lands. These agencies
227. Id. at 9.
228. COMM. ON WATERSHED MGMT., supra note 225, at 16.
229. Guiding Principles, EPA.Gov, http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/
framework/ch3.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2008).
230. Id.
231. See OFF. OF WATER, supra note 226, at 10; see also COMM. ON WATERSHED
MGMT., supra note 225, at 134.
232. Guiding Principles, supra note 229.
233. OFF. OF WATER, supra note 226, at 10.
234. Guiding Principles, supra note 229.
235. OFF. OF WATER , supra note 226, at 10.
236. COMM. ON WATERSHED MGMT., supra note 225, at 32.
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have different missions, authorities, and modes of
operation. The property boundaries of landowners and the
political boundaries of states, tribes, counties, and
municipalities are often unrelated to watershed boundaries.
As a result, when citizens or governments have tried to
coordinate water resource protection or restoration efforts,
they have often found it difficult to do so. Evidence
suggests that the watershed approach improves
collaboration and information sharing among diverse
237partners and leveraging of resources.
The aim of the watershed approach is to move away from a
fragmented approach.238
On April 1, 1997, the governments of the United States and Canada
asked the IJC to make recommendations for how Canada and the
United States could work together to meet the environmental
demands of the 21st Century.239 Among other things, the IJC
suggested establishing "ecosystem based international watershed
boards from coast to coast to prevent and resolve transboundary
environmental disputes."24 0 The goal of the international watershed
boards was to help integrate different levels of government-federal
state, provincial, municipal-and "be available for monitoring,
alerting, studying, advising, facilitating and reporting on a broad
range of transboundary environmental and water-related issues." 241
The underlying premise of the boards, according to a report by the
IJC, is that "local people and institutions are often the best placed to
anticipate, prevent or resolve many problems related to water
237. OFF. OF WATER, supra note 226, at 10; see also COMM. ON WATERSHED
MGMT., supra note 225, at 30.
238. OFF. OF WATER, supra note 226, at 10.
239. See INT'L JOINT COMM'N, THE INTERNATIONAL WATERSHEDS INITIATIVE:
IMPLEMENTING A NEW PARADIGM FOR TRANSBOUNDARY BASINS § EXEC.
SUMMARY (1999), http://www.ij c.org/php/publications/pdf/ID I 627.pdf.
240. See INT'L JOINT COMM'N, THE IJC AND THE 21st CENTURY § EXEC.
SUMMARY (1999), available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/21ste.htm.
241. Id. § 3, Proposal I: Establishment of International Watershed Boards.
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resources and the environment, and to take shared actions towards
shared sustainability objectives."242
Ten years after the original report, IJC made a number of
findings. 24 3 Among them was the conclusion that "international
watershed boards can be an effective paradigm for implementing a
watershed approach along the international border." 244 The
watershed committees provide a great beginning place for long-term
cooperation, long-term studies, and public participation.
III. ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES TO EMPOWERING LOCAL
WATER COMMITTEES TO RESOLVE TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
DISPUTES
A. Advantages
Beginning negotiations over transboundary water disputes with
committees organized around the lowest hydrologic unit has several
advantages over negotiating only at the national level with respect to
fostering cooperation, gaining and using scientific knowledge, and
encouraging public participation.245 Comparing the process and
result of the Mexicali dispute with that of the High Ross Dam
controversy demonstrates that decentralized decision-making, when
appropriate, ensures that local knowledge, cooperation, and
participation is essential in reaching effective solutions. In addition,
the experience of the IJC, in using watershed committees,
demonstrates that watershed committees, organized around
hydrologic units, is a good starting place for fostering cooperation,
gaining and using scientific knowledge, and encouraging public
participation.246
The approach taken in the High Ross Dam controversy encouraged
future cooperation, while the approach taken in the Mexicali dispute
did not.247 Because both sides were pleased with the result, the
likelihood of retaliation is diminished and the likelihood for future
242. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, THE INTERNATIONAL WATERSHEDS INITIATIVE:
IMPLEMENTING A NEW PARADIGM FOR TRANSBOUNDARY BASINS 3 (2009),
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1627.pdf.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id. at 16.
245. See supra pp. 25-27, 31-33.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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reciprocity is increased. Likewise, both sides ensured that their
reputations for cooperation were enhanced, because they successfully
worked together to solve the dispute. Alternatively, the Mexicali
dispute, "not only failed to achieve positive results for Mexicali water
uses, but also established additional structural barriers to future
dialogue and cooperation."248
The High Ross Dam negotiations, unlike the Mexicali dispute,
involved public input. The studies of the negotiations of the High
Ross Dam determined that public participation was a key element of
the success of the negotiations. 249 "Buy-in" from the public,
including interest groups, local governments, and the press, was also
critical to the resolution. 250 Unlike the High Ross Dam controversy,
however, decisions about the Mexicali dispute disregarded input from
those on the Mexico side of the border. In addition, the decision was
ultimately made in the rider of a tax bill, which reduced the ability to
participate of those most directly impacted. The disadvantage of this
approach is described by Professor Noah Hall in the following terms:
Transboundary pollution problems can certainly be
addressed through federal legislation, but congressional
action may not be an ideal solution for several reasons.
First, the states involved in the dispute, like private parties
in litigation, are in the best position to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of various potential resolutions to
the dispute. Second, in many cases Congress will not want
to get involved in the dispute, leaving the states to craft a
solution on their own. Finally, for transboundary pollution
problems that only affect a regional resource, congressional
representatives from other regions have no accountability
to the citizens being harmed.251
Presumably, this conclusion applies both to transboundary
pollution across boundaries within the United States and to
248. Cortez, Donovan, & Whiteford, supra note 162, at 145.
249. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 170; LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 3.
250. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 171.
251. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405, 450 (2006)
(footnote omitted).
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transnational pollution. In addition, according to Professor Hall,
"relying exclusively on national governments to address international
environmental problems has proved to be inadequate."252 The IJC, for
example, explicitly stated that "[d]irect public participation drives the
development of regulations, conduct of cleanup actions,
implementation of preventive measures and changes in societal
attitudes. An informed and knowledgeable citizenry exerts a powerful
influence on policy and decision-makers and allows the public to
participate in policy development." 2 53
Studies of the High Ross Dam controversy concluded that one of
the most important elements of success was good information, which
included experiential wisdom from those who lived in and used the
resource.254 More information, both scientific knowledge and local
experiential knowledge, was critical to a successful resolution. In the
Mexicali dispute, however, the resolution by Congress foreclosed
even going forward with an environmental impact assessment to
determine the potential impact.255 Watershed boards would allow for
ongoing studies, coupled with experiential knowledge, focused on a
particular resource over the long-term.
Comparing the approach taken in solving the dispute over the
High Ross Dam with the approach taken to resolving the dispute over
the All-American Canal illustrates the advantages of engaging local
communities in solving transnational water disputes. 256 Specifically,
the decentralized approach taken in the High Ross Dam controversy,
centered on the needs of resource users on both sides of the border,
was a better approach than the approach taken in the Mexicali dispute
for gathering accurate data, fostering long-term cooperation, and
*257promoting public participation.
252. Hall, supra note 94, at 132.
253. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality:
Achieving the Future -- How to do it: Perspective and Orientation (1998),
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/9br/achievee.html; See also
Hall, supra note 94, at 132 (citation omitted).
254. LIEBOW et al., supra note 90, at 3.
255. GLENNON, supra note 129, at 298-99.
256. See supra pp. 25-27, 31-32.
257. See supra pp. 25-27, 30-32.
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B. Disadvantages
Conducting negotiations at the local level "is not always possible
because some border conflicts have spillover effects elsewhere which
national governments cannot ignore. Moreover, sometimes local
issues can only be resolved in the context of international trade-offs
which may have to be complemented by domestic ones." 258
Obviously, in addition to necessary trade-offs, some states do not
have the resources or sufficiently strong central government to setup
regional committees. 259 This of course, is one of the reasons that the
agreements should have a "rebuttable presumption," with local
negotiations as a starting point, but not necessarily the end point.
Empowering watershed committees to engage in discussions, and
solve disputes, may be particularly difficult in states that have weak
governments or who are involved in conflicts with their neighbors.
However, that drawback does not take away from the potential for
using local watershed committees, because it would hinder
transboundary water management whether it was centralized or
decentralized. In fact, stressing local involvement may be
particularly relevant in less economically developed economies that
contain weak central governments. Water reforms have "paid little
attention to community-based water laws in rural areas within
developing countries" even though such community-based laws,
often in oral form, "govern the use of water by large proportions, if
not the majority, of the world's citizens." 260 In many developing
countries, where the central government is relatively weak, local
groups, such as tribal authorities will necessarily have a greater
role.26'
There are also, at least in the United States, constitutional concerns
with empowering local units of government to negotiate disputes that
cross international boundaries. Giving too much power to the states,
if entering into a formal agreement, risks running afoul of the
258. Alper & Monahan, supra note 6, at 170.
259. BARBARA VAN KOPPEN ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED WATER LAW AND
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (Barbara
Van Koppen, Mark Giordano, & John Butterworth, eds., 2007) ("The penetration
of the state to the local level, in particular in rural areas, is generally weak but this
varies around the world.").
260. Id. at 2.
261. Id. at 6.
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Constitution's mandate that, "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation. "262 Too little power, however, risks
pushing the limits of the anti-commandeering principle. 263
One of the reasons that the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement was a good faith,
nonbinding agreement was to avoid potential constitutional
limitations. While states may not enter into treaties, the Constitution
also provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress .
. . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power."264 The implication, of course, is that States may
never enter treaties, but with congressional consent, they may enter
agreements or compacts. The ultimate determination, whether it is a
treaty or compact, is left to Congress.265
On the other end of the spectrum, if Congress mandates that states
enter into regional negotiations, they may risk violating the anti-
commandeering principle.266 However, there are some solutions that
likely would pass both the anti-commandeering principle and not
violate the Constitution's limits on states entering into treaties. The
solution would be a "hybrid treaty- compact," such as the Skagit
River Treaty.26 7 Professor Swaine characterizes the Skagit River
treaty as a "hybrid treaty-compact" because it "merges a treaty with a
compact-like device as a means of asserting national control over a
matter implicating subnational authority, with Seattle's incentive
deriving from its own self-interest."268
IV. CONCLUSION
In 2009, the United Nations World Water Day focused on
transboundary water resources.269 With a theme of "shared waters,
shared opportunities," the day focused on the need for continued
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
263. Hall, supra note 251, at 44 6 n.245.
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
265. Hall, supra note 251, at 446 n.245.
266. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 403, 521 (2003).
267. Id at 510.
268. Id at 512-13. Professor Swaine's article discusses in great detail the limits
of federalism as applied to the treaty power. Id. at 403.
269. World Water Day 2009, UN WATER, http://www.unwater.org/wwd09/
flashindex.html (last visited January 3, 2010).
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cooperation over the management of transboundary water
resources.270 Fostering long-term cooperation, gathering accurate
data, and promoting public participation is necessary for managing
transboundary water resources. As demonstrated by a comparison of
water relations between the United States and Canada, and the United
States and Mexico, decentralized decision-making, organized at the
lowest appropriate hydrologic unit, is more effective in enhancing
cooperation, data gathering, and public participation than rigid
centralized cooperation organized around political or jurisdictional
boundaries. Because of this, transnational water agreements should
include a rebuttable presumption that negotiations over
transboundary water disputes begin with regional committees
organized at the lowest appropriate hydrological level.
270. Id.
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